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We examine the effect of regime change on privatization using the 2004 election surprise in India.
The pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled
companies that had been slated for definite privatization by the BJP dropped by 3.5 percent relative
to private firms. Surprisingly, government-controlled companies that were only under study for possible
privatization fell by 7.5 percent relative to private firms. We interpret this as evidence of investor belief
of policy irreversibility, where reforms may reach a stage beyond which future regimes have difficulty
reversing those policies. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement,
served as a credible commitment to the government's privatization agenda.
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tkhanna@hbs.eduThe privatization of state assets has been a substantial source of revenues for
governments worldwide, with cumulative privatization proceeds exceeding $1 tril-
lion by 1999 (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Investors have often welcomed this
sell-o⁄ of state assets, citing increased e¢ ciency of private management, particu-
larly in countries such as India where the productivity of state-owned enterprises
has lagged behind those in the private sector. However, many assets slated for
privatization remain in government hands and governments have retained control
rights through continued majority stakes in partially privatized companies.1
One potential explanation for this gap between planned and actualized privati-
zations stems from the often volatile politics in countries attempting to implement
large-scale privatizations: While the party in power may favor the sale of state
assets, privatization is a long run process which may, as in the case of India we
study here, continue across di⁄erent governing regimes with di⁄ering views on
privatization. Since each new government may argue that they are not bound by
the promises of earlier regimes, investors may be concerned that the privatization
process will be derailed by each electoral cycle. As investors solve the backward
induction problem, this may undermine attempts at sell-o⁄s in the ￿rst place.
Privatizing governments face this multi-party variant on the classic hold-up prob-
lem due to the temptation to expropriate the new owners after the transfer of
funds has taken place (Perotti, 1995).
On the other hand, policies may be di¢ cult to reverse once they have been
committed to. Most straightforwardly, there is inertia in policy - legislative
1There exists a large body of research, both theoretical and empirical, on the costs and
bene￿ts of state ownership. See Megginson and Netter (2001) and Shleifer (1998) for an overview
and review of this literature. For a discussion of privatization in India speci￿cally, see Gupta
(2006).
1checks and balances in a parliamentary democracy make policy reversals di¢ cult,
and vested interests may be mobilized to resist changes. Second, a government
may take steps that alter the cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄of future governments (Alesina
and Tabellini, 1990). For example, a government may choose to lay o⁄ workers
in anticipation of future privatization, thereby making it less appealing for future
governments to reverse course. Finally, scholars of political economy also provide
a number of arguments based on government credibility. Governments may not
wish to completely undermine the policies that had been put in place by a pre-
vious regime since the new government understands that it will not be in power
forever, and hence may wish to sustain a cooperative equilibrium with other par-
ties (see, for example, Alesina, 1988 for a classic reference).2 Closely related
is the argument that political parties may put some value on the maintenance
of the reputation of the legislature (as distinct from the political party itself).
Overall, there may thus be a stage beyond which less reformist politicians or new
governments may not wish (or be able) to overturn a privatization-in-progress.3
To what degree are commitments to privatize actually held to be credible by
investors, and to what extent do governments take actions that reinforce investors￿
beliefs that privatizations will be carried out even in the face of regime shifts to less
privatization-friendly governments? India provides a particularly promising site
2A recent illustrative example from U.S. politics was the Senate debate over the use of the
￿ nuclear option￿to over-ride the ￿llibuster of judicial appointments. Many observers suggested
that this would undermine the generally cooperative relations between Democrats and Repub-
licans.
3There are numerous examples of successor governments choosing not to overturn a pre-
decessor government￿ s privatization experience, despite political hostility to divestment on the
successor￿ s part. Examples include the Socialist return to power in France in 1988, which left
the Chirac privatizations in place, the UK￿ s Labour takeover in 1997; the many government
turnovers in Central Europe between 1991 and 2006; and the Prodi government￿ s accession to
power in Italy in 2006. We thank an anonymous referee for providing us with these examples.
2for examining this question. It is a country with a large population of ￿rms that
were until recently at varying stages of the privatization process, active electoral
competition, and where privatization is actively debated as a policy question.
In this paper, we study the e⁄ect of an unanticipated change in the governing
party as a potential shock to privatization programs by studying the change in
stock valuations of partially privatized ￿rms in response to the surprise victory of
the Indian National Congress (INC) party in India￿ s 2004 election. In contrast to
the less-reformist INC, the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had outlined
and committed to an ambitious program of economic liberalization. This included
a stated goal of reducing its ownership of a number of publicly traded ￿rms where
the government still held a controlling stake. According to the Companies Act of
1956, while a shareholder needs over 50 percent ownership for majority control, to
approve a "special resolution" (for example, amending Memorandum and Articles
of Association) 75 percent support is needed. It is also a threshold that has been
seen as "sacrosanct" by prior governments (Economic Times, 2000). Hence, we
take 26 percent as the cuto⁄for government control. This represents what might
be called "veto-proof privatization." However, for ease of exposition we will refer
throughout the paper to ￿rms with government holdings below the 26 percent
threshold as completely privatized, despite the government￿ s continued partial
ownership.
The ￿rms where the BJP intended to relinquish its controlling share were
at many stages of this process when the election took place. Some were being
studied for potential disinvestment; others had already been slated for disinvest-
ment; and in others the government had already reduced its holdings to below 26
percent. As a result, this event serves as a useful laboratory for analyzing gov-
3ernment commitments to privatize (and government commitment in a democracy
more generally). Speci￿cally, we use a list from the Ministry of Disinvestment
(which has since been abolished) to classify all publicly traded companies with
government ownership (i.e. partially privatized companies) as one of the follow-
ing: COMPLETE (government had relinquished control by the election and held
a stake below 26 percent), DIV EST (the company was slated for future disin-
vestment at the time of the election), UNDERSTUDY (the company was being
studied by the government for possible future disinvestment) or NEV ER (the
company was not under consideration for further disinvestment). We emphasize
that by de￿nition all ￿rms in the sample have at least some private ownership,
since we are looking at publicly traded ￿rms. Hence, when we use the terms
privatization or disinvestment below, we will always be referring to the change
from partial to complete privatization/disinvestment. Second, when we refer to
complete privatization or disinvestment, we are referring to companies where the
government holds less than a 26 percent stake.
Our results may be summarized as follows: First, we ￿nd that share prices
of partially privatized (government owned) ￿rms decline by three to four percent
relative to the prices of private ￿rms over a four day window following the an-
nouncement of the election results. Further, there is considerable heterogeneity
in the returns of di⁄erent types of partially privatized ￿rms. Most strikingly, the
largest relative declines are among UNDERSTUDY ￿rms that were under study
for potential complete disinvestment; these ￿rms￿prices decline by seven to eight
percent relative to private ￿rms (signi￿cant at the 0.1 percent level) over the four-
day window. By contrast, the prices of DIV EST ￿rms that were already slated
for future (complete) disinvestment declined by only about 3.5 percent relative
4to private ￿rms. This result is quite surprising, given that DIV EST ￿rms would
be expected to decline by more than other partially privatized ￿rms if a larger
privatization premium had already been factored into their prices. This decline
is signi￿cantly less than that of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. Finally, COMPLETE
companies do not experience signi￿cant relative declines, nor do NEV ER ￿rms
that the prior government had not considered for complete disinvestment. We
￿nd this non-monotonic pattern between likelihood of future privatization and
returns to be highly robust to a range of speci￿cations.
We provide a theoretical framework for interpreting these results. Intuitively,
given that neither completely privatized ￿rms nor never-to-be completely priva-
tized ￿rms su⁄ered abnormal returns, investors did not expect an increase in
government meddling under the INC (relative to private ￿rms) in companies
vulnerable to government interference. Hence, we may interpret the di⁄erence
in the abnormal returns of ￿rms merely under study for complete privatization
(UNDERSTUDY ) and those the BJP had committed to privatize (DIV EST)
as stemming largely from di⁄erent changes in the probability of further privati-
zation. We interpret the greater negative returns of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms as
evidence in favor of some limits to policy reversals.
We further investigate whether DIV EST ￿rms had taken any concrete (di¢ -
cult to reverse) steps that made the government announcement and classi￿cation
credible in the eyes of the market. Such steps would limit the ability for future
governments to reverse privatization plans, in the spirit of Alesina and Tabellini
(1990). Speci￿cally, we consider the possibility that layo⁄s at partially privatized
￿rms obviated the need for future governments to take this politically costly ac-
tion, thus committing the ￿rms to broader restructuring (See, for example, Dinc
5and Gupta (2007) and Bertrand et al (2007) for the political salience of em-
ployment in government ￿rms). Consistent with this hypothesis, we ￿nd that
DIV EST ￿rms that were slated for disinvestment, but did not lay o⁄ workers
in the years prior to the election, had returns comparable to those of ￿rms that
were only under study for potential future privatizations, i.e., the interaction of
DIV EST and layo⁄s is a positive and signi￿cant predictor of returns. Overall,
we interpret our ￿ndings as providing strongly suggestive evidence that reformist
governments may have the ability to put in place changes that constrain future
governments from reneging on pre-committed reforms.
We consider a number of alternative explanations based on incentives to pri-
vatize particular companies for the INC relative to the BJP. Most importantly, we
consider whether our ￿ndings may result from a realignment of political interests
and the resultant need for the government to maintain control of companies for
political purposes (Dinc and Gupta, 2007). Interestingly, we do ￿nd that political
changes in a company￿ s state of incorporation is predictive of market reaction to
the election outcome. However, this is independent of our main results, as we
observe virtually identical returns from state electoral shifts regardless of gov-
ernment ownership. Rather, we interpret these state political e⁄ects as likely
re￿ ecting the value of political connections to the central government. We also
consider alternative explanations based on the labor intensity, pro￿tability, and
leverage of di⁄erent types ￿rms, and similarly ￿nd that our results are una⁄ected.
Finally, we study post-election returns to examine the e⁄ect of actual (real-
ized) government policy on asset values over the two years following the election.
During this period, the specter of government intervention in the economy loomed
much larger. As a result, all partially privatized ￿rms, as well as those already
6completely disinvested, exhibited negative excess returns. However, there are a
number of factors that cloud the interpretation of these long-run results as the
direct e⁄ect of changes in privatization policies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1, we provide a back-
ground description of the Indian election of May 2004 and introduce an analytical
framework to aid in our interpretation of the results. Section 2 describes the data.
In Section 3, we present our empirical ￿ndings, using our analytical framework to
interpret the results, including a discussion of returns over a longer post-election
horizon. Section 4 concludes.
1 Political Background
India o¢ cially announced that it was embarking on an economic liberalization
program in 1991 while under a government led by the Indian National Congress
(INC) party. Although a number of economic reforms were phased in over the
subsequent years, the government made very little headway in privatizing state
companies. By 1999, only 2.5 billion dollars in revenues had been generated
through the sale of state assets.
In 1999, a coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came
to power with more ambitious plans for reform. Further, in their ￿ve years in of-
￿ce, the BJP was much more successful in actual implementation of policies. Of
particular importance for our study, the BJP accelerated the disinvestment and
privatization program, and invited bids for well-established public sector compa-
nies. In all, over 7.75 billion dollars were raised through the sale of controlling
stakes and partial divestments through share issue privatizations (SIPs) in the
7following ￿ve years. In each SIP, a fraction of the company was sold to private
investors through an equity issue on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), with
the government retaining a controlling stake in each company. There was the
expectation, however, that the government would eventually give up its control-
ling stake, reducing its ownership to 26 percent (Gupta, 2005). For instance, the
BJP￿ s political manifesto states, "...the government should progressively with-
draw from involvement in non-priority sectors... In general, it should reduce its
role in manufacturing and services business, where the private sector can serve the
people better except where it is required for strategic reasons, to prevent private
sector monopolies, run important utilities, or in exceptional circumstances." In
what follows, we will refer to complete disinvestment as the government reducing
its ownership share to below 26 percent and we will refer to partial disinvestment
as the government retaining an ownership share above 26 percent. Performance
improvements from these partial disinvestments have been documented (Gupta,
2005), and investors expected further improvements if and when the government
reduced its share to below 26 percent.4
Since the initial privatization plans that the INC laid out in 1991-92, govern-
ments have provided a range of sometimes con￿ icting reasons for privatization,
and for their choices of which government companies would be privatized.5 Both
the 1991 and 1996 governments cited the importance of protecting workers￿in-
terests as a crucial consideration. We return to this later in our analyses that
incorporate data on labor intensiveness and layo⁄s in companies under consider-
4For example, the Economic Times on March 10, 2004 quoted a major rating agency chief
economist saying, "...privatisation is extremely desirable from the point of view of increasing
e¢ ciency of resource use..."
5See www.divest.nic.in for summaries of the annual budgets.
8ation to be privatized. These governments also emphasized that the government
would not cede control over ￿ strategic￿sectors such as mining, power, and railways.
This position was reiterated by the BJP in 1998-99, when they announced that
all non-strategic sectors would be completely disinvested, and also narrowed the
de￿nition of a strategic sector. Additionally, demand-side considerations based
on investor interest would factor into the sequencing of privatizations; we attempt
to control for this below by accounting for pro￿tability and leverage.
In addition to the companies that had already been completely disinvested
by the election of 2004, the BJP published a list of companies that were already
slated for full disinvestment in their following term, as well as a list of compa-
nies that were ￿ under study￿for possible complete disinvestment. Hence, among
government-a¢ liated ￿rms, we will consider four classi￿cations: fully disinvested
(COMPLETE); slated for complete disinvestment (DIV EST); under study for
complete disinvestment (UNDERSTUDY ); and partially disinvested but not
under consideration for full disinvestment (NEV ER).
Finally, it is important to note that some ￿rms owned by state-level govern-
ments had been partially privatized; 5 of these are in our sample, and none was
slated for complete disinvestment or was under study for complete disinvestment.
Hence all are classi￿ed as NEV ER. We did not ￿nd any evidence in our liter-
ature searches that these companies were slated by their state-level owners for
further disinvestment; further, we report results below with this subsample of
￿rms excluded and we do not ￿nd that it substantively changes our estimates.
91.1 Election Surprise of 2004
In its political manifesto, the BJP emphasized that the government should focus
on core areas such as national security, macro-economic management, infrastruc-
ture development (both physical and social) and maintenance of law and order.
Importantly, the party emphasized that the government should withdraw from
manufacturing and services businesses, except in certain strategic cases. This,
along with frequent mention of the budget de￿cit, signaled to the market that a
future BJP government would continue to implement its large-scale privatization
program as described above. In fact, the BJP sold o⁄ stakes in six companies in
the two months prior to the election to beat its ￿scal de￿cit target.
By contrast, the INC (Congress party) platform stressed social change and
employment opportunities for the poor. It mentioned strengthening the private
sector through new management, and selective disinvestments. Further, it was
extremely unlikely that the INC would be able to form a government without
the support of the communist parties. Since privatization would inevitably lead
to some labor retrenchment, the market interpreted the INC platform as largely
anti-privatization and anti-reform (The Economic Times, on April 28, 2004 noted,
"It seems very unlikely that ... a Congress government dependent on support from
the Left, can introduce legislation to push through with privatisation..." ).
Immediately preceding the 2004 elections, the BJP was overwhelming favored
to return to power, as re￿ ected in pre-election opinion polls indicating that the
INC was likely to su⁄er its worst-ever defeat in election history. 6 The elections
6Pre-election polls conducted by Energy Compass, as reported in the Economic Times on
April 8, 2004 stated that BJP would receive between 287 and 307 seats, while the opposition
Congress Party-led alliance would win 143-163. After the ￿rst phase of elections, the Economic
Times reported (N.B. NDA refers to the BJP-led coalition),￿according to the Aaj Tak-ORG
survey, NDA is set to get 93 seats, the Congress-led alliance 44 seats and ￿ others￿three seats.
10were held in various states on di⁄erent days between April 20 and May 10. Even
exit polls taken after the elections just two days before the results were declared
reported that BJP was expected to win. For example, Hindu BusinessLine wrote,
on May 11, 2004, "Exit polls conducted by TV channels predict that the [BJP-led
coalition] is expected to garner 245-265 seats, while Congress and its allies would
bag 190-210 seats."
The election results were declared late in the day on Thursday, May 13. The
vote counts came during the trading day, but there was initially little reaction to
the surprise INC victory, since the market was worried about a hung parliament
after the results started trickling in. However, it was clear that the INC would
require the involvement of the Indian communist party and allies (CPI-M) in order
to form a coalition government, and anti-reform statements made after the market
closed raised fears that the BJP￿ s reform agenda would be undermined by the new
government. On the evening of May 13, the communist allies (the Left Front)
decided that scrapping of the disinvestment minstry was to be a precondition
for the CPI-M to support a INC-led government. The BSE index reacted to the
news by falling six percent the following day. The CPI-M General Secretary, Mr
Harkishen Singh Surjeet, said, "We cannot a⁄ord it (the disinvestment programme
followed by the [BJP-led coalition]). We oppose disinvestment of pro￿t-making
[state-owned companies]" and generally implied that economic reforms would be
This means the NDA is up seven seats, Congress down one seat and others are down six seats.
Another exit poll gave the NDA 82 seats and the Congress-led alliance 55. That means the
NDA is down six seats while the Congress is up nine seats. As per the Star-C Voter exit poll,
NDA will get 80 seats, the Congress-led alliance 53 seats and others seven seats. This means
that the NDA is down 11 seats and the Congress is up two seats. If the exit polls turn out to
be true, this could well be the biggest brand crisis for the Congress party. And, the blame will
inevitably be laid on Sonia Gandhi￿ s doorstep.￿In general, leading Indian dailies, TV channels
and international news agencies like the Economist Intelligence Unit were unanimous in their
views about a Congress loss.
11put on hold. The BSE went into a tailspin, falling an additional eleven percent on
May 17 (markets were closed for the weekend on May 15 and 16) despite senior
members of the INC responding with reassuring statements on future reforms.
The market￿ s concern over the CPI-M￿ s in￿ uence in the new coalition were
put to rest in the following days: After senior members of the INC reassured
the markets on future reforms and the relatively reformist Manmohan Singh was
announced as Prime Minister on May 18, the market recovered by nine per cent
over the next two days. The timeline for the post-election sequence of events is
listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
We thus have two shocks to the political regime ￿May 14 ￿May 17 represents
a relatively extreme shift to policies that the market felt, with some probability,
would be dominated by CPI-M ideology. Taking the longer period, May 14 ￿May
19, the market￿ s reaction re￿ ects investor response to a less extreme political shift,
i.e., a shift from BJP reforms to INC reforms.7 In this paper, we focus on this
longer window, and present results based on the two-day window as a robustness
check.8
1.2 E⁄ect on (partially) privatized ￿rms
As emphasized above, the two main coalitions (BJP and INC) had substantively
di⁄ering views on economic reforms, and privatization was one of the central
7This market￿ s feelings toward Singh￿ s leadership are summarized by Uday Kotak, managing
director of Kotak Mahindra Bank (the Indian partner of Goldman Sachs), who commented that
"[Singh] is a very acceptable face to the markets as well as to most political parties."
8The results for this intermediate window are virtually identical to those of the longer window
in terms of the implied di⁄erences in privatization probabilities. See the Results section below
for further details.
12points of contention. Potential di⁄erences in the treatment of partially and com-
pletely privatized ￿rms include both a shift in the probability of privatization as
well as potential changes in the extent of government interference that may also
impact ￿rm value. While there was no mention by any party of actual reversals
of already-privatized companies, governments obviously have many instruments
through which corporate pro￿ts may be a⁄ected, and their interest and willing-
ness to do so is likely to be greater among ￿rms with prior government ownership.9
In the empirical section, we will estimate reduced forms of the expected e⁄ects of
the leftward political regime shift from the BJP to the INC coalition government
described above. However, to aid in our interpretation of these results, it will be
useful to put some structure on market valuations. Speci￿cally, we will try to
distinguish between changes in valuation caused by di⁄erences in the probability
of disinvestment associated with di⁄erent ruling parties and changes in valuation
caused by di⁄erences in the extent of interference by di⁄erent parties.
As suggested by our description of the privatization process above, we will
consider the e⁄ect on market valuation of four di⁄erent types of ￿rms: already
completely privatized (c); slated for disinvestment (d); under study for disin-
vestment (u); and not considered for disinvestment (n). Again, we emphasize
that when we use the terms disinvestment or privatization below, we will always
be referring to the change from partial to complete disinvestment/privatization.
Let the market valuation of a company of type x 2 fc;d;u;ng under regime
i 2 fBJP;INCg be given by:
9For example, there were fears among recently divested oil companies immediately after the














i is the probability of privatization for a type of ￿rm x under regime
i, V
p
i is the value if the ￿rm is (completely) disinvested, and V
g
i is the value if
the government chooses to retain a controlling share. That is, ￿rm value is the
average of completely privatized and partially privatized valuations, weighted by
the probability of disinvestment. This is a signi￿cant assumption: it implies that
the di⁄erence in valuations of ￿rms of di⁄erent types stems only from di⁄ering
probabilities that they will be disinvested. Thus, ￿rms of all types take on the
same value if completely disinvested. In our empirical speci￿cation, we try to deal
with this concern by including a variety of controls that hopefully absorb other
sources of valuation changes, but this remains a concern to the extent that our
controls are imperfect. Then the change in valuation triggered by a regime shift






















As this expression makes clear, there are many simultaneous changes in valuation
that occur with the regime change, and it is not immediately obvious how one
may identify the various components. However, we are aided by the fact that
companies in di⁄erent stages of the privatization process will have extreme values
14of q that will simplify this expression. In particular, we assume that there was
no risk of renationalization under any regime. This assumption is very much in
line with the Indian government￿ s relations with the private sector over the past
few decades: Since the nationalization of Air India in 1953, the only other major
nationalizations have been the banking and insurance industry nationalizations
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These sectors have since been reopened to
the private sector, and no media mentions have been made in recent years of
any renationalizations. If this is the case, then for ￿rms that had already been
completely disinvested we may set qc
BJP = qc









Similarly, we will assume that if a company is not under consideration for
complete disinvestment by the BJP, the most reformist regime, then it is unlikely
to be disinvested by any party, i.e., qn
BJP = qn






























15We will be primarily interested in comparing the two intermediate ￿rm types d
and u, and in particular what we may infer about di⁄erential changes in prob-
abilities of privatization from market reaction to political regime changes. We























where A is given by:
A =
￿V a








This will be useful if we may put some structure on A. In particular, our
regressions below will generate estimates of ￿V a
INC;BJP and ￿V n
INC;BJP, by look-
ing at the change in market valuation of a and n type ￿rms. This formulation
also highlights the di¢ culties in interpreting returns as changes in probabilities in
general, a point that we will return to below in discussing long run post-election
returns.
2 Data
The data required for our empirical tests include (a) stock prices (b) privatization
information for the government controlled companies (c) company-level controls.
16Our sample is the set of BSE500 stocks, traded on the Bombay Stock Ex-
change in Mumbai. We obtain daily closing price data for each company from
Datastream. The main dependent variable in what follows is the returns (i.e.
daily closing price changes) for each company. We de￿ne election results day,
May 13, as t = 0 and calculate returns over the subsequent trading days. Thus,













t is the closing price of ￿rm f on date t. 10
We use ownership data from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE) database to classify companies as having government ownership. CMIE
has ￿ve ownership classi￿cations, including: Domestic Group; Domestic non-
Group; Foreign Group; Foreign non-Group; and Government. A ￿rm is classi￿ed
as government-owned if it has a positive government holding. In practice, the
central government retained a majority position in almost all ￿rms where it held
a positive stake. For ￿rms classi￿ed as government-owned, we obtained data on
the Indian privatization process and the stage of privatization from the Depart-
ment of Disinvestment, Ministry of Finance (India) website (www.divest.nic.in).
Fully disinvested companies, or companies being considered for full disinvestment,
were classi￿ed on the website as one of "under study", "under disinvestment", or
"disinvested." We generate a set of indicator variables that re￿ ect these clas-
si￿cations: UNDERSTUDY ; DIV EST; and COMPLETE respectively; ￿rms
that were not present on the list were classi￿ed as NEV ER. These indicator
10The results are unchanged if we use risk adjusted returns
17variables map to the ￿rm types (a, d, u, n) discussed the previous section. Unfor-
tunately, within a few months of the election this information was removed from
the website.
These classi￿cations were consistent with discussions in the media surrounding
the BJP￿ s privatization agenda. More importantly, as we will see below, layo⁄s
took place earlier and were larger in DIV EST ￿rms relative to UNDERSTUDY
￿rms; we believe this is the most important pattern in the data that provides some
credibility to the government￿ s posted list.
Data on ￿rm characteristics were also obtained from the CMIE database.
These include size (sales), industry (matched to 2-digit SIC codes), wage bill,
and the state of a company￿ s headquarters. Additionally, labor force data were
obtained from ￿rms￿annual reports. These data had to be hand-collected, and in
some cases the annual reports did not mention labor force numbers; fortunately,
in almost all cases this only involved non-government ￿rms and hence only a⁄ects
our control sample. Data re￿ ect labor force statistics in the month of March; we
collected data for the years 2002 and 2004, which allows us to examine pre-election
layo⁄s.
Finally, for data on Indian elections and political parties running various state
governments, we rely primarily on the Election Commission of India website
(www.eci.gov.in). Further information on political alliances was derived from
www.indian-elections.com. We will provide further information on our use of this
geographic data when we describe our tests on regional political in￿ uence.
The distribution of ￿rms according to stage of disinvestment is listed in Table
2A; in Table 2B we report data for each of our variables, both for the full sample
and disaggregated according to stage of disinvestment. In addition to returns
18over the two and four day windows mentioned above, we also include summary
statistics on the (log of) price changes over the two year window following the
election, which we will discuss in greater detail below.
[Table 2 here]
As these summary statistics suggest, all ￿rms with some government owner-
ship underperformed the market in the wake of the election: For both the May 14
- May 17 and May 14 - May 19 windows, returns of NEV ER, UNDERSTUDY ,
DIV EST, and COMPLETE generate more negative returns than those of
the full sample. In particular, over the May 14 - May 19 window, returns for
government-a¢ liated ￿rms range from ￿8:6 percent for COMPLETE ￿rms to
￿15:7 percent for UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, relative to the full sample average of
￿7:8 percent. Over the longer two year post-election window, beginning at the
end of May 2004, we report the change in the log of prices, owing to the very long
tails of returns. As with other emerging market exchanges, the BSE had a very
high return over this period, with an average log price change of our sample ￿rms
of 0:74. Both NEV ER and DIV EST ￿rms underperformed the market consid-
erably, with log price changes of about 0:5; UNDERSTUDY and COMPLETE
￿rms slightly outperformed the market on average. However, as we will see in
the regressions that follow, a lot of the di⁄erences across groups are driven by
industry e⁄ects.
Also of interest for our discussion, we ￿nd that COMPLETE ￿rms had larger
workforce declines during 2002 - 2004 (21 percent) relative to other companies
with government stakes, suggesting that once freed of government control man-
agement sheds excess labor. Both UNDERSTUDY and DIV EST ￿rms had
19greater workforce declines (8:2 and 7:2 percent respectively) relative to NEV ER
￿rms (4:8 percent). Finally, we note that all government-a¢ liated ￿rm types are
of a similar size, as proxied by log(SALES), and all such ￿rms are larger on
average than other ￿rms in the BSE500.
3 Results
Before proceeding to regression analyses, we show the basic patterns in the data
without conditioning on such characteristics as industry and size. Figure 1
shows the median cumulative returns of our four types of ￿rms relative to the
BSE200 index during May 14 - May 19. Looking at cumulative returns over the
entire post-election event, we see that all government-a¢ liated companies declined
relative to the BSE200. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the extent
of decline. Most strikingly, median cumulative returns for ￿rms that were under
study by the BJP for complete privatization declined by 6 percent relative to
the market, while already privatized and never-to-be privatized disinvested ￿rms￿
returns were indistinguishable from the broader market index. An intermediate
decline was seen by ￿rms already slated for complete privatization.
[Figure 1]
Turning now to our regression analysis, we present results on cumulative re-




f = ￿ + ￿1COMPLETEf + ￿2DIV ESTf
(10)
+￿3UNDERSTUDYf + ￿4NEV ERf + "f
f indexes the ￿rm and "f is an i:i:d: error term. As explained in the data
section, RINC
f is the May 14-19 cumulative returns, and the remaining variables
are indicator variables denoting the type of ￿rm. The omitted category is for
￿rms that never had government ownership, so that the coe¢ cients on the four
indicator variables re￿ ect performance relative to private ￿rms. The results of
this regression are in the ￿rst column of Table 3.
[Table 3]
While returns relative to private ￿rms are negative and signi￿cant for all but
COMPLETE ￿rms, the decline is most pronounced for UNDERSTUDY ￿rms,
with a decline of 8:3 percent relative to private ￿rms. By comparison, DIV EST
and NEV ER ￿rms declined by 4:3 and 2:2 percent respectively. When we con-
trol for industry e⁄ects in column (2), we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on NEV ER is
no longer signi￿cant at conventional levels. In column (3), we add log(SALES)
as a control and ￿nd the results unchanged. We control for geographic hetero-
geneity by including state ￿xed e⁄ects in column (4), and ￿nd that our results
are una⁄ected. Finally, in column (5) government a¢ liated companies with large
21state government holdings are omitted, and the results are again unchanged. We
may summarize our ￿rst main result as follows:
Result 1 In the post-election period May 14-19, NEV ER and COMPLETE
￿rms experience declines that were statistically indistinguishable from the
returns experienced by private ￿rms. UNDERSTUDY ￿rms experienced
declines of approximately 8 percent relative to private ￿rms, signi￿cant at
the 0.1 percent level. DIV EST ￿rms experienced intermediate declines of
approximately 3.5 percent. The decline in UNDERSTUDY ￿rms was also
signi￿cantly di⁄erent (at least at the 10 percent level in all speci￿cations)
from the declines experienced by DIV EST ￿rms.
The interpretation of these results is aided by reference to Sections 1 and
2 above. First, we interpret the coe¢ cient on COMPLETE to re￿ ect the ex-






BJP. This is precisely estimated as zero (standard error
of approximately 0:02) relative to private ￿rms, in all speci￿cations. Similarly,
assuming that the probability of complete disinvestment was close to zero for
all NEV ER = 1 ￿rms, the coe¢ cient on NEV ER re￿ ects the decline in value





BJP) relative to private
￿rms, and hence the likely change in government interference in government con-
trolled ￿rms under the INC. In speci￿cations with controls, this coe¢ cient is
insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, suggesting that the market anticipated a min-
imal shift in government interference in the companies it controlled under the
INC relative to the BJP (beyond industry-wide shifts in government policy which
are absorbed by the industry e⁄ects). Comparing market reaction for DIV EST
22and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on UNDERSTUDY is
signi￿cantly more negative than the coe¢ cient on DIV EST. Di⁄erencing (7)
for the two types of ￿rms, and utilizing the fact that ￿V c
INC;BJP ￿ ￿V n
INC;BJP
(and hence A) is very close to zero, we may estimate the di⁄erential e⁄ect on the















Since the di⁄erence ￿V d
INC;BJP ￿￿V u
INC;BJP is negative (signi￿cant at least at
the ten percent level in all speci￿cations), and the denominator is clearly positive,
this suggests that the market expected a greater change in the probability of
disinvestment of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, relative to DIV EST ￿rms.
We now ask whether there is evidence of speci￿c steps taken that would limit
the scope for privatization reversal of DIV EST ￿rms. Discussions of the po-
litical costs of privatization often focus on the electoral implications of reduced
employment or increased prices (see, for example, Shleifer (1988)). We focus on
layo⁄s, owing to data availability. Further, this has been one of the main con-
troversies surrounding privatizations in India speci￿cally (see Dinc and Gupta,
2007). Finally, given the policy platforms of the INC versus the BJP and the
implied di⁄erences in their bases of support, we argue that the political cost of
layo⁄s would be much greater for an INC government.
Given this asymmetric political cost of layo⁄s, the application of ideas from
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) leads to two basic predictions. First, DIV EST
￿rms should experience larger layo⁄s than UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. Second, to
the extent that the layo⁄s of DIV EST ￿rms re￿ ect an e⁄ort to prepare these
23companies for complete disinvestment, DIV EST ￿rms that undertake layo⁄s
prior to the election should be more committed to continued privatization. That
is, it is necessary for a ￿rm to both be classi￿ed as DIV EST and have pre-election
layo⁄s to have relatively high returns. We therefore also look at the interaction
of pre-election layo⁄s and ￿rm classi￿cations in predicting market reaction to the
election.
In the ￿rst test, we look at the change in (the log of) employment in the years
preceding the election as a function of a ￿rm￿ s classi￿cation:
log(Emp2004) ￿ log(Emp2002) = ￿ + ￿1COMPLETEf + ￿2DIV ESTf
(12)
+￿3UNDERSTUDYf + ￿4NEV ERf + !i + ￿s + "f
In the above expression, !i is an industry ￿xed e⁄ect and ￿s is a state
￿xed-e⁄ect for the location of the company￿ s headquarters. The results are re-
ported in Table 4. Our primary interest is in a comparison of the layo⁄s of
DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. In the speci￿cations both with and with-
out state ￿xed e⁄ects, DIV EST ￿rms have larger workforce declines relative to
UNDERSTUDY ￿rms (columns (1) and (2); this di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the
10 percent level in the speci￿cation with state ￿xed e⁄ects.
Turning now to the implications for returns, we report speci￿cations in Table
5 that augment speci￿cation (10) with the interaction of changes in labor force
with ￿rms￿classi￿cations. In column (1), we see that there is no direct e⁄ect of
layo⁄s on post-election returns. However, our primary interest is whether there
24is a di⁄erential e⁄ect of layo⁄s on the returns of DIV EST ￿rms, i.e., are layo⁄s
an important channel through which the investors believed the BJP was able to
commit future regimes to carry out their intended privatizations. In columns (2)
and (3) we add the interactions of ￿rms￿classi￿cations with layo⁄s. Interest-
ingly, we ￿nd that, among all ￿rms with a government a¢ liation, the relationship
between pre-election employment changes and returns is by far the most signi￿-
cant for DIV EST ￿rms, as re￿ ected in the large and negative interaction term
on DIV EST ￿ ￿log(Emp). In the speci￿cation with both state and industry
￿xed e⁄ects, the coe¢ cient implies that a one percent decline in the labor force
between 2002 and 2004 results in election returns that are 0:83 percent higher
for DIV EST ￿rms. Further, the coe¢ cients on the direct e⁄ects for DIV EST
and UNDERSTUDY , which re￿ ect the returns for ￿rms with no change in la-
bor force between 2002 and 2004, are virtually identical to one another in the
speci￿cation with only industry ￿xed e⁄ects. In the speci￿cation with state ￿xed
e⁄ects, the coe¢ cient on the direct e⁄ect of DIV EST is actually more negative
that that of UNDERSTUDY . Obviously, we do not have random assignment
of layo⁄s, so some caution must be exercised in interpreting these results. Still,
the combined set of results we present above provide compelling circumstantial
evidence in favor of belief in irreversibility by investors:
Result 2 Pre-election layo⁄s were larger in DIV EST ￿rms relative to UNDERSTUDY
￿rms. Further, DIV EST ￿rms that did not experience pre-election lay-
o⁄s had post-election returns that were comparable to (or below) those of
UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. This supports the irreversibility hypothesis as an
explanation for the relatively high post-election returns of DIV EST ￿rms.
253.1 Alternative Hypotheses
While Result 2 provides positive evidence in favor of the irreversibility hypothesis,
we consider a pair of leading alternative interpretations for our results. First, it
may be that the ￿rms to be fully divested earlier are those that would create
the greatest bene￿t to the government, regardless of the party in power. If this
were the case, then the ￿ marginal￿privatization cases that were only at the stage
of being studied for possible privatization would be most adversely a⁄ected by a
shift to a less privatization-friendly government. We refer to this below as the
￿ Ordered Privatization￿explanation.
Prior work suggests that governments may be averse to privatizing some types
of politically strategic ￿rms.11 In particular, Boycko et al, (1996) focus on excess
employment in government ￿rms, as these companies are used to achieve the po-
litical objective of increased employment. In our context, the Indian government
will be better able to control the wage bill for ￿rms where it maintains a control-
ling stake. Hence, it may be politically more costly for the government (BJP
or INC) to lose control over a ￿rm with more potential to cut costs by shedding
labor. DeWenter and Malatesta (2001) observe that, in addition to concerns over
employment, governments avoid privatizing ￿rms that are unpro￿table or heavily
laiden with debt. Hence, we investigate whether there are systematic di⁄erences
between DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms in these characteristics.
We de￿ne the variable WAGE_RATE to be the ratio of a ￿rm￿ s wage bill
to total sales; as measures of pro￿tability and leverage we use PBIT=Assets and
Debt=Equity. The summary statistics in Table 2 show that for pro￿tability there
is virtually no di⁄erence between DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, though
11For a broad discussion of determinants of privatizations, see Gupta et al (2007).
26there are many ￿rms for which pro￿t data are unavailable. For leverage, we ￿nd
that DIV EST ￿rms actually have higher debt ratios than UNDERSTUDY
￿rms. The only characteristic that is consistent with the Ordered Privatization
hypothesis is WAGE_RATE: This variable does indeed appear to be correlated
with the decision to privatize: the mean of WAGE_RATE is 0:067 and 0:139 for
DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms respectively. This di⁄erence is signi￿cant
at the ￿ve percent level. Further, NEV ER ￿rms have a wage ratio of 0.14
that is much closer to that of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. We therefore include
WAGE_RATE as a control variable in speci￿cation (10). This appears in
column (5) of Table 3: the coe¢ cient on WAGE_RATE is not signi￿cant, and
more importantly, the coe¢ cients on our privatization variables are una⁄ected.
Thus, while there is some evidence that labor intensive ￿rms were being held
back from privatization, this does not seem to be the primary explanation for
the di⁄erential market reaction that we study here. Overall, our results provides
tentative evidence that runs counter to the Ordered Privatization explanation.
We recognize that this by no means conclusive, as it may be that the DIV EST
versus UNDERSTUDY classi￿cation is a more precise proxy for the preferred
ordering of privatization for any government, but our test does provide suggestive
evidence to the contrary.
A second concern is that the ordering of privatizations may be a function
of political interests. Indeed, in the case of India speci￿cally, Dinc and Gupta
(2007) provide evidence that government owned ￿rms based in states where the
government holds a majority are less likely to be privatized. It may be, there-
fore, that the BJP held back ￿rms in states where they had a dominant pres-
ence, so that ￿rms in BJP-dominated states are more likely to be classi￿ed as
27UNDERSTUDY than as DIV EST. If, additionally, ￿rm value su⁄ers from
being located in a politically disadvantaged state in general, so that ￿rms in
BJP-dominated states were expected to decline after the change in government,
then underperformance of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms relative to DIV EST ￿rms
after the election may be the result of an omitted variable bias.
The fact that our results are una⁄ected by state-level ￿xed e⁄ects implies that
this is not a concern. As an additional test, we construct the variable BJP04s,
which is the fraction of seats in the federal government obtained by the BJP in
state s in the 2004 election, where s is the state that a ￿rm is headquartered; we
similarly de￿ne BJP99s. Consistent with the work of Dinc and Gupta (2007), the
mean value of BJP99 is indeed much higher for NEV ER and UNDERSTUDY
￿rms (0:46 and 0:64), while the average of BJP99 is 0:36 for DIV EST ￿rms.
Collectively, this does support the hypothesis that BJP politicians may have been
avoiding the complete privatization of ￿rms in their home states. We report re-
sults including these political variables in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3. The
coe¢ cient on BJP04 is negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level, but the
coe¢ cients on our privatization variables are una⁄ected. Thus, while there is
indeed a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the political a¢ liation of a company￿ s home state
on post-election returns, this is independent of our privatization results. Addi-
tionally, we note that the interaction of BJP04 with our privatization variables
is never signi￿cant, implying that the e⁄ect on ￿rm value of being in a politically
disadvantaged state is substantial also for private ￿rms.12
12We view this as a very interesting ancillary set of results, and serves as a contribution on
the value of political connections in the spirit of, for example, Fisman (2001), Ramalho (2003),
and Faccio (2005).
283.2 Robustness
First, we consider whether a di⁄erential risk pro￿le of government-owned ￿rms
might account for the results. To examine this possibility, we repeated our analy-
ses using excess returns from a one-factor market model, and obtained very similar
results. Additionally, we looked at similar regressions for the three largest stock
market shocks in the three years prior to the 2004 election, to check whether
government-owned stocks tend to move together during market crashes gener-
ally. We ￿nd that none of our government ownership variables is sign￿cant in
predicting returns in these other crashes.
Second, we looked at returns over the shortened event window of May 14-17,
which re￿ ected market concerns over a strong communist in￿ uence in the INC
coalition. This generates a comparable set of results in comparing DIV EST
and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. These results, reported in Appendix Table A1,
reveal that the all government-a¢ liated ￿rms had larger declines (relative to the
broader market) over this intermediate window, implying some interference by
the government in ￿rms they held a stake in. The ordering of returns among
NEV ER, COMPLETE, DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms is una⁄ected,
but the magnitudes are much larger, as expected.
3.3 Postscript: post-election returns
As of this writing, it has been over three years since the 2004 election results,
giving us the opportunity to study actual privatization policies of the INC coali-
tion and investor response to these policies. Obviously, investor response to the
2004 election outcome re￿ ects their expectation over a distribution of potential
29outcomes, so we certainly cannot take a stand on the ex post realization of pri-
vatization policy. In fact, the in￿ uence of the Communist Party within the INC
coalition turned out to be surprisingly strong, bringing the privatization process
to a near-standstill. In particular, none of the companies in our analysis (both
DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms) have been privatized ex-post, nor are
there any imminent plans for their privatization. This unexpectedly strong resis-
tance to privatization should have a negative impact on all ￿rms that were under
consideration for privatization. That is, we expect negative returns for DIV EST
and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms in the period following the elections. Additionally,
to the extent that the curtailing of privatization plans caused a convergence in
privatization probabilities for DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, we might
further expect greater declines for DIV EST ￿rms relative to UNDERSTUDY
￿rms.
Unfortunately, there is no crisp event that captures this change in privatization
policies - there were over 100 days with government pronouncements on the future
of privatization during the two years following the election. We try to capture
the long-run change in investor beliefs by examining returns over the two years
following the election (June 1, 2004 - May 31, 2006). A great many other policy
changes were implemented during this period, and it was also a time during which
the Indian market boomed due to high rates of economic growth, so some caution
is merited in interpreting these results. Moreover, the primary focus of this paper
is the (ex ante) expectations of investors at the time of the election, not the ex
post realization, whose interpretation may be clouded by other factors. Given
the very large variance in these long-run returns, we use the di⁄erence in the
logarithm of prices as the dependent variable below.
30Our results are shown in Table 6.13 The ￿rst observation is that the coef-
￿cients on all ownership coe¢ cients are negative, though their magnitudes and
signi￿cance levels are sensitive to the speci￿cation. This might suggest some com-
bination of investor belief in greater interference in partially privatized ￿rms and
changes in the probability of privatization. This seems to operate particularly at
the sector level, as suggested by the di⁄erence between the results in columns (1)
and (2) - the ownership coe¢ cients are more negative without the inclusion of
sector e⁄ects. Additionally, we note that because the coe¢ cients on all owner-
ship variables are negative and di⁄er in magnitude, there is no straightforward
simpli￿cation of (5). This makes it di¢ cult to isolate changes in privatization
probabilities from changes in the extent of government interference in partially pri-
vatized ￿rms. In comparing the coe¢ cients on DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY
speci￿cally, we ￿nd that they are both negative, but similar in magnitude (consid-
ering the lack of precision with which they are measured) in most speci￿cations.
However, given that that the coe¢ cients no longer have a clean interpretation
as probabilities, making any inference of their relative magnitudes is problem-
atic. For example, since the level of the probability of privatization is lower for
UNDERSTUDY ￿rms relative to DIV EST ￿rms, if there were greater interfer-
ence expected for both groups of companies, this could account for the similarly
negative returns of the two groups, even if the change in privatization probabil-
ity were larger for DIV EST ￿rms. Given these complications, we leave a more
complete analysis of long-run post-election returns for future work.
13Unfortunately, due to changes in the BSE500, our list of control companies is somewhat
smaller than in the earlier regressions; we hand-collected price and accounting data for all non-
PRIV ATE companies that have dropped out of the BSE500 in order to maximize the sample
size of ￿ treatment￿￿rms.
314 Conclusion
Government policies are subject to reversal following any regime change. In the
volatile politics of many young democracies in the developing world, there is par-
ticular concern that this sort of reversal may reduce credibility with investors and
hamper investment ￿ ows. In this paper, we study the e⁄ects of political change
on privatizations by analyzing market reaction to the INC party￿ s unexpected
victory over the reformist BJP party in the 2004 Indian election. We provide
evidence on investor belief in limits to policy reversal, documenting in particular
the role of concrete and di¢ cult to reverse interventions that impact a future gov-
ernment￿ s trade-o⁄s in deciding whether to reverse course. We therefore speak to
two important literatures: the political economy of multi-party democracies, and
the process of privatization.
However, we view this as only a very ￿rst step in generating a broader un-
derstanding of these issues. First, it would be useful to know the contexts in
which irreversibility is strongest. We mention at various points in the text the
importance of a legislative democracy with checks and balances, but there is huge
variation in governing institutions within this realm. Research in political econ-
omy has examined di⁄erences stemming from, for example: the extent of electoral
competition; presidential versus parliamentary government; and many others, and
it would be useful to know how these characteristics of government a⁄ect policy
inertia.
Additionally, we have shed some light on one mechanism by which the cred-
ibility (and consequently the irreversibility) of government policy is established,
though it will be useful to consider additional instruments that the government
32may use to make policy commitments credible. We suggest that our methodology,
built on examining valuation responses to unexpected electoral outcomes, may be
a useful technique for examining this question in India and elsewhere.
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Table 1: Timeline of Events 
Thursday, May 13  Election results are finalized before markets close. Relatively little change in the market overall, 
as traders express relief that there will not be a hung parliament. 
13th May evening  Communist party spokesperson states on television that the communists will oppose disinvestment 
if they are involved in forming the government 
14th May Friday  Markets fall in reaction to the prior evening's remarks.  Communist officials make further anti-
reform statements in the afternoon, fueling the decline. 
15th and 16th  Discussions of possible partnering of the Congress with the Communists fill the media 
17th May Monday  Further decline fueled by the weekend's reports 
18th May Tuesday  Sonia Gandhi declines post of Prime Minister, generating a recovery in financial markets.   
Manmohan Singh is heavily favored to be Prime Minister 
19th May  The market continues to rally with the appointment of Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister  
Table 2A. Frequency Distribution of Ownership Type 
 
COMPLETE 6   
UNDERSTUDY 14   
DIVEST 11   
NEVER 30   
PRIVATE 432   
 
COMPLETE is an indicator variable denoting a fully 
privatized firm. NEVER is an indicator variable denoting a 
firm that was not being considered for future disinvestment 
at the time of the election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable 
denoting that the firm had been slated for disinvestment by 
the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an 
indicator variable denoting that the BJP was studying the 
possibility of future disinvestment. PRIVATE is an 
indicator variable denoting firms that had no government 
ownership Notes: For Debt/Equity and PBIT/NA we list medians rather than means because of the presence of extreme outliers.  WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the 
wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 are the fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 respectively.  
Table 2B -  Summary Statistics by Firm Type 
Firm Type     Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs        Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs 
All  May 14-19 Returns  -0.078  0.053  493  DIVEST  May 14-19 Returns  -0.116  0.055  11 
  May 14-17 Returns  -0.170  0.077  493    May 14-17 Returns  -0.226  0.098  11 
 
Δlog(price), May 31, 
2004 - May 31, 2006  0.74 1.02  410   
Δlog(price), May 31, 
2004 - May 31, 2006  0.49 0.38  10 
 log(SALES)  6.298  1.433  479    log(SALES)  8.222  1.751  11 
 WAGE_RATE  0.151  0.786  462    WAGE_RATE  0.068  0.080  11 
 Debt/Equity  0.720  35.978  364    Debt/Equity  0.700  16.948  8 
 PBIT/NA  10.473  82.560  429    PBIT/NA  14.285  6.054  10 
 BJP99 0.361  0.296  481    BJP99  0.361  0.336  11 
 BJP04 0.256  0.212  481    BJP04  0.213  0.189  11 
 
log (Emp2004) -
log(Emp2002)  0.047 0.30  264   
log (Emp2004)– 
log(Emp2002)  -0.072 0.10  11 
                    
COMPLETE  May 14-19 Returns  -0.086  0.037  6  NEVER  May 14-19 Returns  -0.096  0.048  30 
  May 14-17 Returns  -0.236  0.053  6    May 14-17 Returns  -0.247  0.080  30 
 
Δlog(price), May 31, 
2004 - May 31, 2006  0.76 0.81  6   
Δlog(price), May 31, 
2004 - May 31, 2006  0.49 0.56  29 
 log(SALES)  8.311  1.115  6    log(SALES)  7.593  1.407  28 
 WAGE_RATE  0.074  0.079  6    WAGE_RATE  0.112  0.062  27 
 Debt/Equity  0.135  0.106  2    Debt/Equity  1.235  2.027 6 
 PBIT/NA  17.025  15.182  2    PBIT/NA  1.780  7.719 21 
 BJP99 0.482  0.376  6    BJP99  0.457  0.350  28 
 BJP04 0.299  0.333  6    BJP04  0.333  0.252  28 
 
log (Emp2004)– 
log(Emp2002)  -0.21 0.21  5  
log (Emp2004)– 
log(Emp2002)  -0.048 0.14  22  
Table 2B -  Summary Statistics by Firm Type (continued) 




                    
UNDERSTUDY  May 14-19 Returns  -0.157  0.052  14           
  May 14-17 Returns  -0.280  0.060  14           
 
Δlog(price), May 31, 
2004 - May 31, 2006  0.81 0.64  14         
 log(SALES)  8.092  1.264  14           
 WAGE_RATE  0.132  0.094  14           
 Debt/Equity  0.145  1.925  10           
 PBIT/NA  19.705  32.936  12           
 BJP99  0.643  0.433  14           
   BJP04  0.230  0.230  14                
 
log (Emp2004)– 
log(Emp2002)  -0.082 0.15  14         
Notes: For Debt/Equity and PBIT/NA we list medians rather than means because of the presence of extreme outliers.  WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the 
wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 are the fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 respectively.  Table 3 - Effect of Ownership Type on Four day Post-Election Returns May 14-19 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
COMPLETE -0.013  -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012  -0.013 -0.010  -0.012 
 (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.018)  (0.017) 
DIVEST -0.043***  -0.038**  -0.037*  -0.035*  -0.036*  -0.035* -0.036**  -0.038** 
 (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) (0.018)  (0.018) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.084***  -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.013)  (0.013) 
NEVER -0.023**  -0.014  -0.016  -0.017  -0.014  -0.014 -0.013  -0.015 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.012) 
log(Sales)     -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 -0.001  -0.001 
     (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
WAGE_RATE          -0.014    
           (0.009)    
BJP04            -0.035*** -0.044*** 
            (0.012)  (0.012) 
BJP99              0.020** 
                (0.008) 
Industry  FE  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Observations 493  492  478  470  466  454 469  469 
R-squared 0.09  0.20  0.21  0.27  0.26  0.28 0.23  0.24 
Notes: Four day returns is the dependent variable in all regressions.  COMPLETE is an indicator 
variable denoting a fully privatized firm. NEVER is an indicator variable denoting a firm that was not 
being considered for future disinvestment at the time of the election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable 
denoting that the firm had been slated for disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the election.  
UNDERSTUDY is an indicator variable denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of future 
disinvestment. WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 are the 
fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 respectively.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 
Table 4: Relation between Ownership Type and Employment changes  
 (1)  (2) 
COMPLETE -0.309*** -0.323*** 
   (0.098)  (0.122) 
DIVEST -0.120**  -0.104* 
   (0.052)  (0.062) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.051  0.029 
   (0.078)  (0.097) 
NEVER -0.118*  -0.101 
   (0.061)  (0.078) 
Log(Sales) 0.011  0.030 
   (0.021)  (0.021) 
Log(2002 Empl)  -0.032  -0.052** 
   (0.023)  (0.024) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
State FE  No  Yes 
Observations 260  254 
R-squared 0.29  0.36 
Notes: Dependent variable is log (2004 Employment) - log(2002 
Employment) in all the regressions. COMPLETE is an indicator 
variable denoting a fully privatized firm. NEVER is an indicator 
variable denoting a firm that was not being considered for future 
disinvestment at the time of the election.  DIVEST is an indicator 
variable denoting that the firm had been slated for disinvestment by 
the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator 
variable denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of future 
disinvestment. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
 
 Table 5: Effect of Employment Changes on Four day Post-Election Returns May 14-19 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
COMPLETE -0.027  -0.006  -0.009 
 (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.046) 
DIVEST   -0.037  -0.102***  -0.143*** 
   (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.068***  -0.087***  -0.087*** 
   (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
NEVER -0.024 -0.026  -0.013 
   (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
log(Sales) 0.000  0.001  -0.001 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Δlog(Emp) 0.001  0.004  0.010 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Δlog(Emp)* 
PRIVATIZED     0.111  0.063 
        (0.107)  (0.141) 
Δlog(Emp)* 
DIVEST     -0.610***  -0.829*** 
        (0.160)  (0.160) 
Δlog(Emp)* 
UNDERSTUDY     -0.083  -0.158** 
        (0.071)  (0.079) 
Δlog(Emp)* 
NEVER     -0.037  0.469 
        (0.069)  (0.337) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State FE  No  No  Yes 
Observations 251  251  245 
R-squared 0.32  0.35  0.46 
Notes: Four day returns is the dependent variable in all regressions.  The measure of 
employment changes in all regressions is log (2004 Employment) - log(2002 
Employment). COMPLETE is an indicator variable denoting a fully privatized firm. 
NEVER is an indicator variable denoting a firm that was not being considered for 
future disinvestment at the time of the election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable 
denoting that the firm had been slated for disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the 
election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator variable denoting that the BJP was 
studying the possibility of future disinvestment.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
Table 6 - Effect of Ownership Type on two-year Post-Election Returns June 1, 2004 -May 31, 2006 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COMPLETE  -0.269 -0.232 -0.229 -0.214 -0.209 
  (0.309) (0.310) (0.285) (0.369) (0.369) 
DIVEST  -0.539*** -0.463*** -0.355*** -0.259**  -0.260** 
  (0.124) (0.143) (0.131) (0.119) (0.126) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.248  -0.541*** -0.463**  -0.161  -0.163 
  (0.165) (0.195) (0.197) (0.263) (0.279) 
NEVER -0.529***  -0.300*  -0.290  -0.238  -0.241 
  (0.115) (0.170) (0.186) (0.221) (0.238) 
log(Sales)      -0.143***  -0.148*** 
      (0.044)  (0.039) 
WAGE_RATE       0.004 
               (0.046) 
Industry  FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  323 323 314 294 293 
R-squared  0.06 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.40 
Notes: Change in the logarithm of share price is the dependent variable in all regressions.  
COMPLETE is an indicator variable denoting a fully privatized firm. NEVER is an indicator 
variable denoting a firm that was not being considered for future disinvestment at the time of 
the election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable denoting that the firm had been slated for 
disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator variable 
denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of future disinvestment.  Sales is firm sales 
in 2004. WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the wage bill to sales in 2004.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Appendix Table A1 
 
 Effect of Ownership Type on two day Post-Election Returns May 14-17 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
COMPLETE -0.076***  -0.075***-0.064***-0.061***-0.060***-0.059*** -0.060*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)  (0.020) 
DIVEST -0.067**  -0.061** -0.057** -0.055* -0.055* -0.055*  -0.055* 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029)  (0.028) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.120***  -0.118***-0.108***-0.122***-0.120***-0.105*** -0.106*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)  (0.017) 
NEVER -0.088***  -0.073***-0.068***-0.074***-0.069***-0.068*** -0.069*** 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.019) 
log(Sales)     -0.006*  -0.006*  -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** 
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
WAGE_RATE       -0.018    
         (0.016)    
BJP04           -0.027  -0.031* 
           (0.017)  (0.018) 
BJP99         0.008 
                   (0.013) 
Industry  FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State  FE  No No Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Observations  493 492 478 470 454 469  469 
R-squared  0.16 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.28  0.28 
Notes: Four day returns is the dependent variable in all regressions.  COMPLETE is an 
indicator variable denoting a fully privatized firm. NEVER is an indicator variable 
denoting a firm that was not being considered for future disinvestment at the time of the 
election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable denoting that the firm had been slated for 
disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator 
variable denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of future disinvestment.  
WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 are the 
fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
 